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The development of operational performance indicators is of utmost importance for nu-
clear power plants, since they measure, track, and trend plant operation. Leading in-
dicators are ideal for reducing the likelihood of consequential events. This paper describes
the operational data analysis of the information contained in the Corrective Action Pro-
gram. The methodology considers human error and organizational factors because of their
large contribution to consequential events. The results include a tool developed from the
data to be used for the identification, prediction, and reduction of the likelihood of sig-
nificant consequential events. This tool is based on the resilience curve that was built from
the plant's operational data. The stress is described by the number of unresolved condition
reports. The strain is represented by the number of preventive maintenance tasks and
other periodic work activities (i.e., baseline activities), as well as, closing open corrective
actions assigned to different departments to resolve the condition reports (i.e., corrective
action workload). Beyond the identified resilience threshold, the stress exceeds the sta-
tion's ability to operate successfully and there is an increased likelihood that a conse-
quential event will occur. A performance indicator is proposed to reduce the likelihood of
consequential events at nuclear power plants.
Copyright © 2015, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC on behalf of Korean Nuclear Society.1. Introduction
Every nuclear power station is subject to daily organiza-
tional stresses, which result from the cumulative strain of
routine operation, maintaining regulatory and operating(P.F. Nelson).
d under the terms of the
ich permits unrestricted
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sevier Korea LLC on beharequirements, and supporting long-term reliable operations.
In addition, operational conditions are periodically changed
to accommodate safe refueling, perform shutdown main-
tenance activities, and restart for another cycle. The impact
of these strains varies depending upon the age of the plant.Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://
non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any me-
lf of Korean Nuclear Society.
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result in work that goes beyond normal plant operations,
regulatory compliance, and typical maintenance activities.
These conditions result in periods of time when individual
and organizational workloads increase significantly, raising
the likelihood of errors, which in turn, further increase
personnel workloads.
“Safety culture” emphasizes the importance of developing
and maintaining a strong Problem Identification and Resolu-
tion Program [1], typically referred to as a Corrective Action
Program (CAP) where all incidents, risk significant or not, are
to be reported. The term “safety culture” was first used in
INSAG's 1988 “Summary Report on the Post-Accident Review
Meeting on the Chernobyl Accident,” [2] where it is described
as “that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organi-
zations and individuals which establishes that, as an over-
riding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the
attention warranted by their significance”. All nuclear power
stations in the United States have a Problem Identification and
Resolution Program as required by regulation.
A plant's CAP is provided to employees, who use it to
identify problems or issues and to record them in a problem
report, formally known as a condition report (CR). The events
that trigger these reports serve as sources of organizational
stress, as they represent additional scopes of work beyond
those required for maintaining regulatory compliance and
reliable plant operation. Increasing numbers of CRs accom-
panied by CRs with high severity levels indicate that organi-
zational resilience levels are being exceeded. Here, we define
resilience as the intrinsic ability of an organization to adjust
its functioning prior to, during, or following changes and
disturbances, in order to sustain required operations for the
current conditions of the plant [3].
Some condition reporting programs are considered “low-
level,” as the threshold required for generating a CR is very
minor (e.g., editorial errors in procedures or minor errors in
design drawings). Low-level CR programs are characterized by
having high levels of granularity as criteria for the identifica-
tion of a situation requiring the generation of a CR (i.e.,
thousands of items are identified in a single year covering
virtually all plant organizations). Alternatively, some condi-
tion reporting programs are considered to be “high-level,” as
the generation of a CR must meet a certain, high criteria (e.g.,
only plant hardware issues are considered). Generally, most
United States plants are characterized as low-level condition
reporting programs, such that each typically generates in
excess of 10,000 CRs each year.
The fact that even minor incidents reported in low-level
condition reporting programs can combine with others and
cause an accident brings forward the concept of high reli-
ability organizations (HROs), which include nuclear power
generation plants, naval aircraft carriers, air traffic control
systems, and space shuttles. Studies of HROs have challenged
the postulations of Perrow's Normal Accident Theory [4], in
which he insists that “normal” or system accidents are inev-
itable in extremely complex systems. He states that given the
characteristics of the system involved, multiple failures that
interact with each other will occur, despite efforts to avoid
them. He continues to say that operator error is a very com-
mon problem, many failures relate to organizations ratherthan technology, and big accidents almost always have very
small beginnings. Such events appear trivial to begin with
before unpredictably cascading through the system to create a
large event with severe consequences.
HROs, and specifically nuclear power plants (NPPs), are
complex, but have nonethelessmaintained exceptional safety
records over a long period of time. According toWeick et al [5],
HROs are learning organizations characterized by a set of
cognitive practices that enable people to work safely and
eventually create mindfulness and reliability. These practices
involve constantly tracking and investigating small errors,
resisting oversimplification, sensitivity towards current op-
erations, and committing to resilience.
HRO research can be said to represent a focal shift in safety
research, from a focus on failure to a focus on success. The
HRO perspective represents a valuable addition to safety
research, and we believe that combining the HRO perspective
with data that is readily available, specifically from the CRs
contained in the CAP database, provides the necessary ele-
ments to produce a resilience curve and an associated resil-
ience threshold. This can be applied at NPPs in order to
identify areas where human errors are more likely to result in
consequential events, to reduce human error rates, to
consider organizational interaction factors, and to develop a
leading performance indicator.
The application of resilience engineering is relatively new
to the nuclear industry, but it has been used in general avia-
tion, offshore oil and gas production, safety science, and
healthcare, among others, and it has provided a substantial
body of knowledge and experience [6e10]. In particular,
Woods et al [10] compared the demand-stretch model of an
organization with the stressestrain curve and resilience
property from materials science. This prior work is largely
qualitative, whereas here we present a quantitative
application.
Section 2 describes the data used. Section 3 identifies the
sources of stress and strain and presents the methodology
used to develop the resilience model. Section 4 presents the
resulting organizational resilience curve and threshold. Sec-
tion 5 shows the application of the resilience threshold to
develop a leading performance indicator to predict situations
where the likelihood of consequential events is increased.
Section 6 contains the conclusions and describes future work.2. NPP operational data
We propose the use of the CAP database to evaluate human
and organizational performance. Other studies have exam-
ined licensee event reports (LERs) to evaluate human perfor-
mance, types of events, etc. [11e13]. These studies provide
valuable ways of looking at the historical events. We believe
that the inclusion of all plant specific events (LERs plus all the
other events reported in the CRs) increases the statistical
validity of the data and enables the specific and detailed study
of a plant's operating experience and organizational
behaviors.
In this study, the CAP database from an operating plant
was analyzed to test the database's ability to yield measurable
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years of CRs (2005e2014) were analyzed, yielding not only
interesting tendencies and insight into resilience, but also a
basis for the construction of leading organizational perfor-
mance indicators at NPPs.
In order to begin to understand the information contained in
theCRs, aswell as the complex interdepartmental relationships
in HROs such as NPPs, it is necessary to define the most
importantadministrativeunits,knownasorganizations,aswell
as the extent of their responsibilities in everyday activities.
A simplified flow diagram is shown in Fig. 1, which outlines
a typical process used for planning, executing, and completing
a work package. A work package can be considered an orga-
nizational activity that involves manipulating plant equip-
ment or other hardware. The work package contains the
necessary prerequisites, approvals, work steps, and hardware
parts (consumables) that will be necessary to complete the
activity on a component or set of components. The flow dia-
gram shows the types of activities during which the events
that are the focus of this paper occur. That is, when a problem
(e.g., unplanned equipment failure) or a necessary work ac-
tivity [e.g., preventive maintenance activity (PM)] is identified,
there are many opportunities for organizational errors. These
errors can occur based on the organizational programs and
procedures necessary to authorize and performwork on plant
equipment. Since the actions recommended to resolve these
errors are combined with other organizational work activities
associated with low-level CR programs not directly associated
with plant hardware, it can be seen that organizational
workloads can vary greatly, as well as be significantly affected
by the quantity and scope of CRs.
As shown in Fig. 1, a work order (WO) is written to trigger
the work process. If the work is emergent or unplanned, a
work planner “walks down” the job per the WO and develops
draft work instructions, which are then reviewed and final-
ized. A work package is then prepared and planned. This
package is reviewed and approved and is issued to the
appropriate maintenance discipline. The package is sched-
uled per the work scheduling process, and when the sched-
uled workday arrives, the working discipline retrieves theFig. 1 e Typical organization process flow of wopackage, gathers parts, materials, tools, etc., and begins the
process of completing the activities required and described in
the work package. The operations organization ensures that
the proper equipment clearance tags are hung so that the
equipment to be worked on is isolated, such that work can be
performed safely. Maintenance for the working discipline
(e.g., mechanical, electrical) begins by obtaining work start
approval from operations (i.e., operations releases the equip-
ment to maintenance), a pre job briefing is typically held be-
tween maintenance and operations, then the working
discipline is released to perform the work. After the work ac-
tivities are completed, a postmaintenance test is performed to
ensure the equipment operates correctly and, if the test is
passed (i.e., results are acceptable to operations), then main-
tenance releases the equipment back to operations. Then, if
applicable, the work process activities continue to obtain the
necessary final reviews and approvals (e.g., engineering re-
views) and the package is closed and archived. Follow-on ac-
tivities include entries made in equipment history logs, as
well as other monitoring processes (Probabilistic Risk
Assessment risk profile, maintenance rule, equipment his-
tory, etc.).
This organizational process is performed thousands of
times during an operating cycle and is also performed during
planned and unplanned plant outages. This paper analyzes
the errors that occur during these processes, and demon-
strates how this constant tracking becomes the data feedstock
used to producemethods that can become part of the solution
for the plant to minimize similar errors, and most impor-
tantly, to avoid consequential outcomes (e.g., plant trip,
inadvertent actuations).
As part of the effort to determine the organizational factors
that lead to an event (CR), a detailed review of the CAP data
made it possible to better understand which plant organiza-
tions have greater exposure to consequential errors, given the
number of CRs generated that identify that organization as the
responsible party for resolving the condition described in
the CR. Also, through analysis of the actions that are gener-
ated after the occurrence of an event, the creation of the CR,
and the subsequent investigation, we gain more insight intork activities at a nuclear power plant (NPP).
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work together, or at times, do not work together to produce
conditions of low resilience and higher likelihood of conse-
quential events. The time series of the events provides insight
into the cyclic behavior, particularly controlled by the outages.
This can be used for predictive purposes and is presented in
the next sections.
2.1. Operational data time series
One way to observe the operational experience at the plant is
to plot the events that occur at the plant over time. This graph
is presented in Fig. 2, using data from the operating NPP. In
this graph, the events are plotted by level of severity, the red
[significant condition adverse to quality (SCAQ)da condition
adverse to quality that, if uncorrected, could have a serious
effect on safety or operability. Based on Nuclear Quality
Assurance-1 Standard issued by American Society of Me-
chanical Engineers, ASMENQA-1-1994.] representing themost
significant contributor to risk, next the gray (condition adverse
to quality on a station level, CAQ-L1), and finally the green
(condition adverse to quality on a department level, CAQ-L2).
Although the more severe (red) events are plotted on an
exaggerated scaledon the right side of the graph, with be-
tween zero and four SCAQs a monthdthis does not detract
from the fact that the peaks in the number of events
frequently coincide for all severity levels. Presumably, we will
have more events during cold shutdowns, refueling, and
outages, because there is an increased amount of mainte-
nance work, more people at the plant, especially contractors,
and the peaks in Fig. 2 illustrate this.
Fig. 3 plots the events per month, but for only the period
2007e2008, allowing the relationship between the differentFig. 2 e Events 2005e2012. CR, condition report; SCR severity levels to be observed in greater detail. In
particular, the first and last peaks (April 2007 and October
2008, respectively) for this period show that the peaks of all
three severity level CRs coincide. Despite the fact that we
see dips (i.e., lower total number of CRs), we can also
observe that they, too, generally follow the same trend. In
other words, in periods where the total number of CRs is
low, the three highest severity level CRs are also at mini-
mums. This may seem to be an obvious conclusion; how-
ever, the severity level of a single CR is independent of the
number of CRs generated. It is determined by predefined
criteria, and therefore a CR's severity level is not related to
the absolute number of CRs generated. Thus, based on Fig. 3
we can conclude that there is a correlation between the
number and scope of open CRs and the likelihood of
occurrence of a more severe CR, up to and including the
most severe, an SCAQ. In addition, it is important to
mention that even when the red peak (SCAQ) is not above
the green (CAQ-L2), we are still seeing significant results,
remembering that the scale is different. There may be only
one significant event, as in April 2008; however, the three
types of events are aligned, occurring simultaneously. This
means that as more events of less severity occur, it is more
likely that significant events may occur.
Fig. 4, which shows events per week, includes the least
severe events (condition not adverse to quality, CNAQ) in blue
and locates the SCAQs by red dots. The higher red dots
represent occasions when there were two SCAQs in 1 week.
The importance of the CNAQs is their large number, andwhile
they can be events that do not affect components, they
sometimes generate as many as 2,000 activities on top of the
already large amount of work that each department must
accomplish.CAQ, significant condition adverse to quality.
Fig. 3 e Events 2007e2008. CR, condition report; SCAQ, significant condition adverse to quality.
Fig. 4 e Events per week, 2005e2014. CNAQ, condition not adverse to quality; CR, condition report; SCAQ, significant
condition adverse to quality.
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From the CAP database, we can develop a simple planning
tool, as presented in Fig. 5. The cumulative frequency curve
was developed for determining the probability of an SCAQ
occurring given the number of CRs accumulated since the last
SCAQ.
Although this is a simplified approach for developing an
indicator (a more complete approach is presented later), this
curve can be used to determine the position of the station
relative to overall workload, which has been shown to be
correlatedwith the likelihood of the occurrence of an SCAQ. In
fact, performance indicator thresholds could be established to
indicate when a management barrier or other compensatory
action may be implemented in order to reduce the likelihood
of conditions meeting SCAQ criteria. In the case of this
particular plant, for example, before there have been 5,000 CRs
since the last SCAQ, an organizational barrier or other actions
(e.g., increased equipment performance reviews and moni-
toring) should be implemented in order to reduce the proba-
bility of the next SCAQ occurrence. While this can be helpful,
the plant requires more insight into how the organizational
factors influence the failures in human performance, in order
to select the proper barrier to implement. An analysis of
causal factors of the events and methods for choosing effec-
tive barriers is discussed by Nelson andMartı´n del Campo [14].
Also, in order to comprehend how plant processes and activ-
ities affect organizational factors and the resultant stress and
strain they impose on station personnel, the inter- and
intradepartmental factors are discussed in the following
section.Fig. 5 e Probability of a significant condition adverse to quality
condition report.2.3. Interdepartmental factors
As part of the effort to better understand the organizational
factors and human performance events that cause station
level events, a detailed review of the CAP database was per-
formed. It is the best source of empirical data for records of
events at all levels and across all organizations, and a thor-
ough analysis enables one to understand which plant orga-
nization identified the problem and the organizations
responsible for correcting the problem. The number of CRs
generated with an organization being identified as respon-
sible, either as the identifier (i.e., generating a CR) or as the
owner of an action within the CR, gives important insights
into station procedural and process functions that result in
specific plant organizations being more at risk for causing or
responding to station events. In addition, through analysis of
the actions that are generated after the occurrence of an
event, we gain more insight into how the organizations
communicate and work together or, at times, do not work
together.
Fig. 6 presents the distribution of CRs among the station
departments for all the severity levels. In 10 years, more than
121,000 CRs were created by 169 organizational functions (it is
recognized that some organizational functions may be shared
among different station departments). In this data survey, the
procedures development function (labeled “Procedures” in the
figures) is the leading generator of CRs. Procedures are
recognized as being part of the cause, aswell as the resolution.
Since the procedure writing function affects all activities at a
station, it does not seem unreasonable that this function
produces and receives the maximum number of actions.(SCAQ) given number of events since last occurrence. CR,
Fig. 6 e Departments. (A) Creating condition reports (CRs) 2005e2014. (B) Receiving actions 2005e2014. DG, Diesel generator;
I&C, Instrumentation & Calibration; HVAC, Heating Ventilation and Air conditioning; LABS, Laboratories; MAINT,
Maintenance; MET, Metrology; MGR, Manager; NPMM, Nuclear Purchasing and Material Management; NSSS, Nuclear Steam
Supply System; OPS, Operations.
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Fig. 7 e Number of significant conditions adverse to quality (SCAQs) for departments responsible for more than one SCAQ.
ENG, Engineering; I&C, Instrumentation & Calibration; MGR, Manager.
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tions generated, 106 SCAQs, and seven plant trips.
However, the procedures function does not play a role in
generating the most significant events in the 10-year period.
As shown in Fig. 7, the organizational functions that have
caused two or more SCAQ events fall under the responsibility
of the engineering, operations, and maintenance de-
partments. That is, procedures are responsible for the ma-
jority of the CRs, but not the SCAQs.
The actions for other organizational functions received
after an SCAQ was generated are shown in Fig. 8A and the
number of actions for the SCAQ owner in Fig. 8B. The obser-
vation is that the CR owners assigning actions add consider-
able strain on the individual departments, which in turn can
increase workloads. In Section 3, this is shown to increase
organizational stress.
It is difficult to describe organizational responsibilities and
authority relations in simple statements. Plant organizations
have specific functions and associated products (e.g., create
procedures, perform maintenance), but they must also
perform a variety of administrative activities. These activities
include job-specific qualification and certification training,
access authorization, emergency response organization
participation, outage related assignments, etc. It is possible,
through interviews and an extended set of observations over
many different organizational activities, to begin to under-
stand the number and complexity of interdepartmental re-
lationships, as done by Schulman [15]. We have found, as
Schulman [15] found in his qualitative study at Diablo Canyon,
Nuclear Power Plant, San Luis Obisbo, CA, USA, “Where error,oversight, or failure had foreseeable consequences that
threatened individual or environmental safety, the adminis-
trative procedures were likely to be most elaborate and the
interdepartmental interactions most intense”. The process in
this study is to determine the responsibilities, interactions,
successes, and failures through analysis of the reports
included in the CAP.3. Materials and methods
Due to a similarity between cognitive systems engineering and
how organizations adapt, and engineer resilience into their
organizations, we propose a new method that provides orga-
nizational stress and resilience insights with respect to their
relationship to plant performance. Using the 10 years of CAP
data, the correlation is examined between increasing organi-
zational demands and the likelihood of consequential events
(i.e., plant trips, equipment clearance order error, component
trips, inadvertent actuation of safety injection, etc.).
In this regard, it is anticipated that new and different in-
sights into how organizational activities that support or
facilitate work processes (i.e., soft processes) can and do result
in both direct and indirect changes to equipment performance
and reliability (i.e., hard impacts). A correlation was observed
between the demand on an organization and the level of risk
at the plant. This concept, which relates the resilience to the
demands over time, is presented in Fig. 9. In this figure, we can
observe that the demand on the plant can be thought of as the
Fig. 8 e Actions. (A) For others from significant conditions adverse to quality (SCAQs). (B) Generated for SCAQ owner. DG, ;
ENG, Engineering; I&C, Instrumentation & Calibration; HVAC, Heating, Ventilation and Air conditioning; MGR, Manager;
NSSS, Nuclear Steam Supply System.
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related to the risk that exists at the plant due to all of the
ongoing activities. The resilience can be thought of as the
organization's ability to cope with the risk and bounce backfrom increased risk (i.e., strength) [16]. However, if the stress
reaches a resilience threshold, the plant will become brittle
and not be able to adapt. In this case, the failure point is
reached when an SCAQ occurs.
Fig. 9 e Organizational stress over time. SCAQ, significant condition adverse to quality.
Nu c l e a r E n g i n e e r i n g a n d T e c h n o l o g y 4 8 ( 2 0 1 6 ) 1 1 4e1 2 8 1233.1. Organizational stress and strain curve
One way to characterize and measure an organization's
resilience can be based on an analogy from the field of ma-
terials engineering, the stressestrain curve (Fig. 10). A
stressestrain curve is created by stretching (straining) a ma-
terial and measuring the resulting load (stress). The area
under the linear (uniform) portion of the curve is called the
resilience, the energy the material is able to absorb before
deforming permanently. Materials that are brittle break along
this linear region, without any yielding (permanent defor-
mation). These terms and concepts correlate well with the
basic finding in cognitive systems engineering that demandFig. 10 e Basic demand-stretch or stressestrain curve.factors are critical [16,17]. Thus, the hypothesis is that to
characterize a cognitive system of people and machines, one
should examine how that joint system responds to different
amounts of work activities. It is interesting that the two fields
use similar language, resilience, and brittleness, to charac-
terize how an organization “stretches” as demands increase.
3.2. Organizational resilience curve methodology
The methodology is data-based and includes consideration of
human error and organizational factors because of their large
contribution to consequential events.
Step 1. Gather CRs and work activities (i.e., actions, PMs
andWOs) permonth from the CAP database, covering a period
of 10 years. The outage history is needed for the same period
of time. Within the category of severe events (SCAQs), the
consequential events (main turbine trips and reactor trips)
should be highlighted.
Step 2. A scatter plot is developed with stress on the y-axis
and strain on the x-axis, to develop the resilience curve. The
stress is represented by the number of open CRs. The strain is
the number of activities (i.e., WOs, PMs, and open actions).
Step 3. Develop the equation for the resilience curve, with a
breakpoint defined as the resilience threshold. The resilience
threshold is the point where main turbine and reactor trips
begin to appear.
Finally, this equation can be used to calculate where the
plant is on the resilience curve at any time, as well as to pre-
dict where it will be in the next months, if no changes are
made in the organization. When the stress factor (the number
of CRs and the sum of the different work activities that are in
process) approaches the resilience threshold, a barrier should
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should be implemented by the station organization to reduce
the likelihood of failures in human performance and poten-
tially avoid a consequential event. These failures in human
performance are not only due to human errors, but also pro-
cess and procedural complexities, as well as management
decisions that impact plant performance. These organiza-
tional processes and decisions can have both direct and latent
effects on plant equipment and can encompass all types of
engineering, maintenance, and operations programs. For
example, testing and maintenance frequency decisions
should be based on historical data and the significance of the
equipment to nuclear safety and reliable plant operations.
Therefore, a surveillance testing interval of every 6 months
may be too infrequent to detect the onset of corrosion, and
should be modified given the historical data.4. Results and discussion
We can plot the strain as the number of PMs, CAP actions, and
other WOs completed per month, which corresponds to an
ever-present base level activity load for the plant organiza-
tions. The open actions are summed, since these increase the
organizational strain level of thestation.Thestress is related to
the number of CRs opened or remaining open in the month.
Fig. 11presents theresultingorganizational resiliencecurve for
the plant used for this pilot study. The red squares represent
plant trips, thepointof exceeding the resilience thresholddthe
ability to absorb malfunctions in performance and maintain
performance to some standard of performance (e.g., online
power generation). The shaded area indicates the area whereFig. 11 e Organizational resilience. The shaded area containan increased likelihood of a plant trip is found, and the base of
this trapezoid is the perpendicular line that indicates where
this increase in likelihood begins and is defined as the resil-
ience threshold. At this point, it is assumed that the organi-
zational elements and their interactionswith plant equipment
through planned and unplanned work result in more failures
that cause consequential events (e.g., plant trips).4.1. Application
Based on this resilience curve, a method of anticipating
consequential events was developed in the form of a leading
performance indicator, using fuzzy logic. This provides the
ability to monitor organizational demands against the
increasing probability of a consequential event over time.
Performance indicating alerts and thresholds are then pro-
posed to provide awareness and recognition of “challenges” to
organizational stress levels and resilience limits. This is
shown as an increase in the probability of consequential
events versus work activities, with thresholds associated with
specific levels of risk (i.e., likelihood of plant trips). As noted
earlier, the key premise is that increasing organizational de-
mands, as recorded in the CAP database, reflect equipment or
process problems that, in turn, increase the likelihood of a
consequential event. As organizational demands increase, the
organizational resilience limit is approached and the likeli-
hood of the occurrence of a consequential event increases up
to the point that a probabilistic prediction of the next conse-
quential event can be made. This approach bases itself on
plant-specific operating experience and history; specifically,
the number of consequential events and the demand on the
organization. Thus, this indicator can predict the need to takes the plant trips and majority of consequential events.
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implement a barrier to protect the plant from such an event.
4.1.1. Performance indicators
There are three types of performance indicators used in the
nuclear industry: lagging, current, and leading. Lagging per-
formance indicators provide information about a selected
parameter (e.g., human performance) as reflected in events
that have occurred in the past. For example, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) Human Factors Information
System database [18] lists the LERs, examinations reports, and
inspection reports associated with human factors that were
reported during each year for each plant. Analysis of these
events can help to determine categories of human
performance-related errors. Counting the number of occur-
rences in each error category provides the basis for a lagging
indicator of human performance. According to Reason's [19]
model, lagging indicators are measures associated with the
unwanted consequences of unsafe acts, such as those
described in LERs and significant event reports.
Current performance indicators provide information on
selected parameters based on current conditions. For
example, most nuclear plants have the voluntary Problem
Identification and Resolution Program reporting system that is
part of the CAP, as described earlier. Those items flagged as
involving human performance can be placed in error cate-
gories and counted. The current performance indicator in this
example is the number of items in each error category. Ac-
cording to Reason'smodel, current performance indicators are
measures associated with the occurrence of unsafe acts, such
as acts that are self-reported by workers, whether or not there
was a significant consequential event.
Leading performance indicators provide information about
developing or changing conditions and factors that tend to
influence future human performance. This same concept
holds true for plant performance as well, since equipment or
component events can provide information about developing
or changing conditions that influence future plant perfor-
mance. According to Reason's [19] model, the leading in-
dicators would be associated with the causes of unsafe
actions, particularly theworkplace and organizational factors.
There have been efforts to develop leading performance in-
dicators in the nuclear industry, such as EPRI’s human per-
formance assistance package [20]. The Electric Power
Research Institute (EPRI) systemswere piloted at three nuclear
plants in the US, and a concern that was presented in the final
report of the pilot study [21] was the inability to create a
mapping from a leading indicator to an outcome, which is one
of the intentions of the model in this paper.
The development and use of leading performance in-
dicators of human performance is a reasonable expectation
given the volume of data being collected on a continuous basis
in the nuclear industry. A structured approach to analyzing
the data is presented here in order to establish a useful focus
on available proactive, or leading information and intelli-
gence. Ready access to these ideas is fundamental for any
organization in order to avoid consequential events.While the
lagging and current performance indicators are fairly well
understood and used, the leading performance indicators
have beenmore challenging and, thus, have not yet been usedto their fullest potential. The approach to developing leading
indicators in this paper is to establish a resilience threshold
andmonitorwhen the stress factor approaches this threshold,
which will indicate whenmeasures should be taken to reduce
the likelihood of occurrence of a consequential event.
4.1.2. Approach for developing a leading performance
indicator
In order to develop a leading performance indicator from the
resilience curve (Fig. 11), a fuzzy logic approach [22] was
chosen, because the data support approximation rather than
precision; however, a mechanism is needed to convert this
rather imprecise data to a crisp performance indicator.
Several studies have introduced the fuzzy set theory (FST)
approach for performance assessment of health, safety, and
environment in organizations [23,24]. These studies show
important reasons to use FST: reduction of human error,
creation of expert knowledge, and interpretation of large
amounts of vague or highly varied data.
The CAP databases used in United States nuclear plants
prove to be appropriate for the use of FST for similar reasons.
Theyhaveapreponderanceofhumanerrorrelatedevents (most
minor, but some significant and consequential). They identify
implementedCAPcorrectiveactionsand lessons learned,which
are the primary plant mechanisms for authorizing changes to
virtually all station processes to improve performance. They
also function as the primary repository or data warehouse for
identifying, assigning,andschedulingwork relatedactivities for
almost all station activities, whether or not they are a baseline
functionoranaddedCAP function. In this regard,CAPprograms
represent an excellent barometer of the time-dependent
“pressure” an organization is exposed to, relative to activities
defined in normal (routine) job functions and those that repre-
sent additional scopes of work with due dates resulting from
problems or issues captured by the CAP process.
In our case, the fuzzy inference system uses the amount of
work activities and CRs as input and the if/then rules are
applied to calculate the consequences of exceeding the resil-
ience threshold, that is, the increased likelihood of plant trips.
While the focus is on plant trips as being the consequential
event of measure, it is important to mention that a large
percentage of the other consequential events occurred above
the resilience threshold value as well. These other non-plant
trip consequential events include: 85% of the SCAQs, 80% of
the significant component trips, and 80% of the equipment
clearance order problems.
MATLAB's Fuzzy Logic Toolbox (version 2.1.1; The Math-
Works, Inc., Natick, MA, USA) was used to create and edit a
fuzzy logic system. The required parameters are encoded in
fuzzy representations, and the interrelationships between
them take the formofwell-defined “if/then” rules following the
following steps. (1) Membership functions are built for the two
inputs (CRs, work activities) and also for a single output called
plant trip. The linguistic labels “low”, “medium”, and “high”
were used to “fuzzify” the functions, based on normalized dis-
tributionof thevalues50%, 50e75%, and>75%; corresponding
to 8,480, 8,480e9,400, and >9,400 CRs/mo. Fig. 12 shows the
distribution. (2) Five fuzzy if/then rulesaredefined todetermine
the likelihood of a plant trip occurring in the short term, given
thequantity of CRs and activities. These rules effectively define
Fig. 12 e Normal distribution of condition reports (CRs).
Nu c l e a r E n g i n e e r i n g a n d T e c h n o l o g y 4 8 ( 2 0 1 6 ) 1 1 4e1 2 8126the shadedarea inFig. 11, although the last two include thearea
above and to the right of the point of thefirst plant trip, butwith
less weight since there is no evidence at this time. (i) If “CRs” is
<low> and “work activities” is<low> then “plant trip” is<low>.
(ii) If “CRs” is <medium> and “work activities” is <medium>
then “plant trip” is<medium>. (iii) If “CRs” is<high> and “work
activities” is <high> then “plant trip” is <high>. (iv) If “CRs” is
<high> then “plant trip” is <high>, weight ¼ 0.5. (v) If “work
activities” is<high> then “plant trip” is<high>, weight¼ 0.5. (3)
Apply implication method: to formulate the mapping from a
given input to an output, the ANDmethod with the prod (prod-
uct) operator is utilized, and the last two rules are assigned a
weight of 0.5, due to less evidence obtained from the data. (4)
The aggregationmethod sum is used to aggregate theoutput. (5)
The output is “defuzzified” using the centroid calculation in
order to obtain the likelihood of a plant trip given varying
combinations of numbers of CRs and work activities.
Fig. 13 shows the surface graph of the likelihood of a plant
trip occurring in the short term as a function of the number of
CRs andwork activities obtainedwith this system. The general
objective is to evaluate the conditionswhere the likelihood of a
plant trip increases by varying the values for CRs and work
activities. The red squares again represent the plant trips.Fig. 13 e Likelihood of next plant trip as a function of
condition reports and work activities in the surface viewer
of the Fuzzy Logic Toolbox.In order for a performance indicator to be useful, it should
be uncomplicated (measurable) and straightforward. For this
reason, the results acquired from the inference system are
laid out in tabular form in Fig. 14.
If station personnel were to track their location on Fig. 14,
the indicator would notify station leaders when plant and
organizational stresses are increasing beyond an “alert” level,
developed through the inference process described above. For
stress levels in the white band, there is a 25e40% conditional
likelihood that a plant trip would occur in the short term
(within the next month). The X's indicate the color band for
each of the plant trips over 9 years (2006e2014); the first plant
trip occurred in the yellow band; however, the remaining six
all occurred in the orange band (2 in 2007, 2008, 2 in 2010, 2011,
and 2013). There were no plant trips during 2009, 2012, and
2014. Those time periods are associated with the white and
light green color bands, which further adds verification of the
indicator's validity.
This performance indicator could be further enhanced
through identifying a “required action” level where
management-directedcompensatorymeasurescouldbe taken
based on examination of the current plant and organizational
status or performance relative to significant plant and organi-
zational functions. The leading indicator presented here is
analogous to a thermometer type or heat index performance
indicator. It should create awareness in management and
station personnel, leading to further internal examinations
when stress levels are exceeding predefined limits. It should
also lead the plant management and personnel to further
examine current plant conditions for vulnerabilities of a plant
trip. The use of the white band region could be assigned as the
“alert” band and the yellow region could be designated as the
“required action” band. The alert band indicates the appro-
priate time to begin to reduce strain on the plant (reduce work
activities, suchasPMs,WOs, and/orCAPactions) or implement
measures or barriers to effectively address current station
vulnerabilities and increase the resilience threshold. The
required action band indicates the region where immediate
development and implementationof identified stress reducingFig. 14 e Conceptual performance indicator. aConditional
likelihood in the short term.
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are required to be implemented and monitored.
It is important to note that with this leading performance
indicator, actions taken to return to lower regions may not be
conducive to the intent of CAPs (i.e., to identify and correct
problems). Thus, in that regard, this indicator's value is in its
ability to predict when increased likelihoods of plant trips
could occur, which in and of itself, represents the involuntary
reduction in resilience since the plant trip changes both plant
and organization to an outage frame of mind (i.e., other work
stops and focus is solely on returning the plant back to at-
power conditions). However, by predicting conditions
whereby increased plant trips are more likely to occur based
on plant specific operating history, there is an opportunity for
organizations to pause and make an assessment of current
conditions and in so doing, re-scope and reprioritize activities
to increase resilience (e.g., free up critical resources that may
be currently committed to less significant activities or
reschedule work activities to more appropriate time frames).
This leading indicator is intended for this purpose, and if
implemented by nuclear plant organizations, can provide an
important cue to perform a “resilience examination”.
4.2. Conclusions
The conclusion of this research is that it is possible to monitor
organizational stress levels and implement compensating
actions before the plant organization and equipment reach
the point where undesirable events (e.g., plant trips) occur.
Organizational performance improvement is a generic
concern at commercial NPPs, and the approach described in
this paper provides a method to improve organizational per-
formance beyond that currently achievable with event
reporting and CAP monitoring, through the evaluation of
organizational stress levels and associated resilience levels,
leading to the development of a proposed leading perfor-
mance indicator. It has been shown here that the CAP data-
base can be used for many purposes including how to (1)
describe organizational factors between and within de-
partments; (2) calculate the probability of an SCAQ given the
number of CRs reported since last occurrence; (3) detect when
the station is at risk of exceeding its resilience; and (4) develop
an organizational performance indicator.
We have also shown that the CAP databases are proper
candidates for the use of FST, due to the scope and high
variability (i.e., uncertainty) of items captured in CAP pro-
cesses that, at some level, are all contributors to overall
organizational and plant performance levels.
We have found, as did Hollnagel and Fujita [25], that
resilience engineering provides a way to identify the capabil-
ities that a complex sociotechnical system must have to
perform acceptably in everyday situations, as well as during
accidents. Applying the cognitive system engineering analogy
to organizational resilience, we were able to build a stresse-
strain curve to relate the station's stress (i.e., CRs) to the strain
(i.e., work activities) that allows the station to continue to
operate successfully. The station's CRs that are accounted for
in this report are both “soft” CRs in terms of the process ac-
tivities required to operate and maintain an NPP and the
“hard” CRs in terms of the equipment and component issuesthat place further demand on organizational performance and
that can also generate consequential plant events.
Thus, the organizational performance can be characterized
by a strain and an associated stress, which indicate levels of
organizational resilience. The strain is defined as the sum of
the preventive maintenance, WOs, and open CAP actions.
Organizational strain is seen to increase before, during, and
just after an outage, but can also have peaks during at-power
times. The stress is measured by the number of CRs, which is
the plant's mechanism for identifying events, errors, and
other failures across almost all plant processes. An organiza-
tion's resilience is its ability to withstand these stresses and
strains and still satisfactorily perform activities. The point
where the stress and strain result in consequential events,
such as a plant trip (i.e., the “breaking point”), is the resilience
threshold.
This paper provides amethod formeasuring and analyzing
stresses in term of the likelihood of consequential events
based on plant specific operating experience. These parame-
ters form the technical basis for developing a leading organi-
zational resilience performance indicator. Since SCAQs
represent times when demand on the organization (i.e.,
stress) exceeds its resilience limits, we use the occurrence of a
plant trip as the consequential event of concern. Thus, when
the stress factor exceeds the resilience threshold, it is more
likely that a plant trip will occur. The performance indicator
presents a conceptual color band arrangement representing
the increased likelihood of a plant trip based on the stress
factor. When the stress factor approaches the resilience
threshold, additional barriers and other provisions should be
considered for implementation.
When a particular problem is identified and resolved, the
solution, represented by a corrective action or set of actions,
does not always remain effective over long periods of time
(i.e., years). The continual monitoring, application, and
communication of the described process is necessary to
assure that the resilience performance indicator continues to
provide useful and timely information. Because change and
adaptability increase resilience, the process will be improved
by continual or periodic updating. Reductions in consequen-
tial events at the plant level over a period of time will be the
key indication that either organizational stress has been
reduced to more acceptable levels, or that organizational
resilience has been increased due to increased organizational
capacities and capabilities.
Processing the operational data daily or at least weekly will
provide a regular update of the stress factor and the resilience
threshold and produce a more accurate leading performance
indicator for preventing consequential events.Conflicts of interest
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